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SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
by Karen Patton Seymour* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Second Circuit has long been the country’s preeminent court in the 
field of securities and financial regulation.1  Since the passage of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”), the Second Circuit has been the leading 
interpreter of U.S. securities laws and arguably the most influential court in 
the area of securities regulation in the world.  From 1961 to 1978, the 
Second Circuit produced nearly five times as many securities law opinions 
as the average federal appellate court; the Second Circuit alone was 
responsible for one-third of all securities opinions issued by appellate 
courts.2  Particularly, the Second Circuit handed down up to 70 percent of 
the opinions that appear in securities law casebooks covering the same 
period.3  It is little wonder, then, that the Supreme Court frequently has 
called the Second Circuit the “Mother Court” in the area of securities.4 
The Second Circuit’s influence in the realm of securities goes beyond 
pure numbers.  The court’s membership has included several celebrated 
judges who have been particularly influential in the field of securities 
regulation, among them Learned Hand and Henry Friendly.  According to 
some, Judge Friendly did more to influence the law of securities regulation 
 
*  B.A./B.S., Southern Methodist University, 1983; J.D., The University of Texas School of 
Law, 1986; L.L.M., University Of London, 1987; Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP; 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District Of New York, 
1990–96; Chief of the Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of 
New York, 2002–04.  The author would like to acknowledge the contributions of Sullivan & 
Cromwell associates John J. Hughes, III, and Jeremy O. Bressman and summer associates 
Markus Brazil, Chris Brown, Beth Olsen, and Alex Self. 
 
 1. See JEFFREY B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT:  A HISTORY OF 
UNITED STATES COURTS IN NEW YORK, CONNECTICUT & VERMONT 1787–1987, at 151 
(1987). 
 2. See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation:  The 
Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 792 (1997). 
 3. See id. at 793. 
 4. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 275–76 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in judgment) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).  
Indeed, in a recent book, Justice Stephen Breyer comments that securities cases emanating 
from the Second Circuit have “had considerable influence, because the legal community has 
long thought that the Second Circuit . . . understood securities law and securities markets 
especially well.” STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD:  AMERICAN LAW AND THE 
NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 115 (2015). 
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than any other judge in U.S. history.5  The reputation of the Second Circuit 
in the realm of securities has been so great that other courts, including the 
Supreme Court, often mention by name the particular judges that decided a 
given Second Circuit precedent to justify their reliance on that decision.6  
And many courts have long looked to its jurisprudence for guidance in 
deciding novel or complex securities law issues. 
Several factors may explain the Second Circuit’s distinctive influence in 
these fields.  The Second Circuit has a distinct geographic advantage:  its 
jurisdiction includes New York City, home to the largest securities market 
in the world.  Another factor at play is the sophisticated bar, including both 
government lawyers and private practitioners that practice in the circuit.  
Indeed, some leading securities lawyers—for example, Jerome Frank, a 
one-time chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission—have sat 
on the Second Circuit bench. 
Given its preeminence in this field, the Second Circuit has often been the 
court to pave new ground in the realm of securities law.  It was the first 
appellate court to recognize a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.7  It 
was one of the first courts to create liability under that rule for trading on 
nonpublic information.8  And a landmark ruling in 2014 limiting “tippee 
liability” in insider trading cases came from the Second Circuit.9  These 
innovations, which continue to this day, have gone a long way toward 
establishing the Second Circuit as the vanguard of the federal appellate 
courts in the field of securities. 
I.  DEVELOPING ROBUST CIVIL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
FOR THE SECURITIES LAWS 
The following sections track the Second Circuit’s significant role in 
developing civil enforcement mechanisms for federal securities laws, 
including taking the lead in defining the scope of SEC enforcement actions 
and private rights of actions. 
A.  New Securities Laws Passed During the New Deal 
In the throes of the Great Depression and informed by lessons of the 
stock market crash of October 1929, Congress passed the Securities Act and 
 
 5. See Morrison, 561 U.S.  at 275–76 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Louis Loss, In 
Memoriam:  Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1722, 1723 (1986)); Sachs, supra note 2, 
at 780–81.  Indeed, Friendly’s name is invoked in ten securities opinions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and in over three hundred securities opinions outside of the Second Circuit. 
Sachs, supra note 2, at 781. 
 6. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. at 275 (Stevens, J., concurring); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 238–39 (1988); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723; Fulton Cty. Emps. Ret. 
Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., 675 F.3d 1047, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012); Liberty Prop. Trust v. 
Republic Props. Corp., 577 F.3d 335, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J., dissenting). 
 7. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730. 
 8. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 9. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
242 (2015). 
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the Exchange Act.10  The Exchange Act created the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and gave it the mission of enforcing new 
securities laws created to restore investor confidence in U.S. capital 
markets.11  From their inception, the SEC and these new securities laws 
were controversial.12  Contemporary critics raised questions about the 
constitutionality of these new laws.13  But the SEC successfully withstood 
these tests, and its enforcement authority quickly became a powerful tool.  
With it, the Second Circuit became an important forum for litigating 
enforcement actions. 
One of the first of such actions, Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,14 helped 
redefine the relationship between broker-dealers and their customers.  The 
SEC found that Charles Hughes, a registered broker-dealer firm, sold 
securities well above their market prices without disclosing this fact to its 
customers (primarily homemakers and widows).15  The SEC revoked 
Charles Hughes’s broker-dealer registration.16  Hughes challenged that 
decision on several grounds, including that the SEC did not have sufficient 
evidence to prove a violation of the securities laws.17  Though the Second 
Circuit conceded that there was minimal evidence that he actually made 
false statements to its customers, the court affirmed the penalty, concluding 
that Hughes’s fraud consisted of its failure to disclose the large markup it 
added to market prices.18  The court reasoned that broker-dealers “hold[] 
 
 10. The acts were informed by a report of the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency that described the abuses in the securities markets.  The report attributed the stock 
market crash to many of these abuses. Philip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 215–17 (1959); 
see also James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959) (“[The Senate Banking and Currency Committee] spread on the 
record more than the peccadillos of groups of men involved in the issuance and marketing of 
securities.  It indicted a system as a whole that had failed miserably . . . .”). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d(a), 78n(a) (2012); Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, 
Introductory Comment:  A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 329–30 (“These new securities laws 
were among the many Roosevelt Administration efforts to stimulate the economy and restore 
confidence in the capitalist system.”). 
 12. Milton V. Freeman, A Private Practitioner’s View of the Development of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 18, 1819 (“When the SEC 
was established in 1934 . . . there was no real acceptance of the [acts] in the financial 
community. . . .  In the earlier years there was substantial dispute between the [SEC] on the 
one hand, and the New York Stock Exchange and the investment banking industry on the 
other.”). 
 13. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 11, at 337. See generally Jacob Lippman, 
Constitutionality of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 9 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (1934) 
(discussing the constitutionality of the Securities Act and the SEC’s authority).  The SEC’s 
perceived legitimacy was not aided by the appointment of Joseph Kennedy to the 
Commission, as he may have made much of his fortune through market manipulation and 
insider trading. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 11, at 348.  Roosevelt jokingly adopted the 
motto “it-takes-a-thief-to-catch-a-thief.” Id. 
 14. 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 15. Id. at 436. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
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[themselves] out as competent to advise” and that “in view of [their] expert 
knowledge . . . [were under a duty] not to take advantage of its customers’ 
ignorance of market conditions.”19  In so holding, the Second Circuit was 
the first court to adopt the SEC’s “shingle theory”—the theory that broker-
dealers, simply by virtue of their position, make an implied representation 
to customers that they will be dealt with fairly.20  The SEC later expanded 
this theory and applied it in a number of cases, bringing actions against 
broker-dealers for “churning” (a practice of trading stocks repeatedly in a 
client’s account to generate more commissions), high-pressure sales tactics, 
and failing to disclose conflicts of interest, among others.21 
Charles Hughes also set the stage for Judge Charles Clark’s widely cited 
dissent in Baird v. Franklin.22  The suit in Baird resulted from a scandal 
involving the Wall Street giant Richard Whitney, the wealthy and well-
connected president of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).23  Whitney 
had been hailed as the “Great White Knight” of Wall Street during the 1929 
market crash when he bought shares of blue-chip stocks as the market 
fell—helping eventually to stabilize the market and end the crash.24  As 
president of the country’s largest stock exchange, he had opposed the new 
securities laws when President Roosevelt originally proposed them.25 
During the recessionary year of 1937, Whitney’s firm, Richard Whitney 
& Co., became strapped for cash.26  To prop up the firm, Whitney used 
some of his clients’ securities as collateral (without authorization), 
including securities belonging to the New York Yacht Club, of which he 
was the treasurer.  Although members of the NYSE Committee were aware 
of these unlawful activities, they took no action against Whitney.27  A few 
months later, as rumors were circulating that Richard Whitney & Co. was 
insolvent, NYSE accountants audited the company and learned that the firm 
had been operating with insufficient capital.  The firm quickly failed, and 
two customers of the firm—Mary Stevens Baird and the New York Yacht 
Club—sued Arthur Franklin, treasurer of the NYSE, for their losses.28 
A majority of the Second Circuit panel, in a brief opinion by Judge 
Augustus Hand, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Baird’s claim on 
 
 19. Id. at 437. 
 20. See Carl Wartman, Broker Dealers, Market Makers and Fiduciary Duties, 9 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 746, 749 (1978) (explaining that Charles Hughes served as the judicial affirmation 
of the shingle theory). 
 21. Id. at 749–50. 
 22. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 23. Id. at 239–40. 
 24. Michael Beschloss, From White Knight to Thief, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/upshot/from-white-knight-to-thief.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/AR9K-TGH2]. 
 25. Stock Exchange Practices:  Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72nd Congress) and S. Res. 56 
and S. Res. 97 (73rd Congress) Before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 73d 
Cong. 6582 passim (1934) (statement of Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock 
Exchange). 
 26. See Baird, 141 F.2d at 240. 
 27. See id. at 241. 
 28. See id. 
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the grounds that she could not prove that the NYSE’s inaction caused her 
losses.29  Judge Clark dissented vigorously.  Citing Hughes, Clark reasoned 
that, although the securities regulations do not explicitly provide for a 
private right of action, the purpose of the Securities and Exchange Acts is to 
protect unsophisticated investors from the “overreaching[]” of those who 
understand the securities markets.30  Without a private right of action, Clark 
argued, the “avowed purpose of [protecting investors] would indeed be a 
snare and a delusion.”31  Although it did not carry the day in the Second 
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit later adopted Judge Clark’s reasoning.32  Judge 
Clark’s dissent also provided a legal foundation to hold stock exchanges 
liable for the activities of their members and was one of the first opinions to 
articulate a theory of private action under the securities laws.  Less than two 
months after his Baird dissent, Justice Clark cited his dissent in an opinion 
suggesting that the Securities and Exchange Acts implied a private right of 
action.33 
B.  Development of the Private Right of Action 
In retrospect, the Second Circuit’s eventual holding that the securities 
laws create a private right of action for fraud was one of the most 
significant Second Circuit rulings on securities regulation in history, 
although that may not have been apparent at the time, when federal courts 
regularly fashioned private rights of action based on traditional tort law 
concepts and the equity maxim that “every right withheld must have a 
remedy.”34  The Supreme Court championed this principle as early as 
Marbury v. Madison,35 proclaiming, “[i]t is a settled and invariable 
principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every 
injury its proper redress.”36  This sentiment reached its heyday in the 
Supreme Court’s 1917 decision in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby,37 
a decision later used to find private rights of action under the securities 
laws, in which the Court found: 
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it 
results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute 
was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is 
 
 29. Id. at 239. 
 30. Id. at 245 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953) (“We are in substantial 
agreement with Judge Clark’s dissenting opinion in the case of Baird v. Franklin . . . .”). 
 33. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir. 1944).  Judge Augustus Hand, 
who had written the majority opinion in Baird, joined that opinion. 
 34. Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of 
Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864 n.15 (1996); see, e.g., 
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1916). 
 35. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 36. Id. at 147; see Stabile, supra note 34, at 864 n.15. 
 37. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). 
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implied . . . .  This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi 
remedium [(where there is a right, there is a remedy)].38 
Beginning in the 1930s, the standards for recognizing new implied causes 
of action became stricter.39  The explosion of governmental regulation 
during the New Deal led to greater reluctance by courts to imply new 
private rights of action.  Judges were increasingly concerned that treating 
every violation of a federal statute or regulation as a tort that entitled private 
plaintiffs to sue would unleash an unmanageable flood of litigation and 
upset Congress’s intended methods of enforcement—especially when the 
statutes and regulations themselves were written in broad, remedial terms 
that did not supply a precise rule of decision for a court to apply.40  But the 
movement against implying new private rights of action was gradual—and 
federal courts resisted the application of this trend to the federal securities 
laws for several decades.41 
At least one commentator has described the period leading up to the mid-
1970s as the Supreme Court’s “ebullient stage” for recognizing private 
rights of action under the securities laws,42 a description that applies 
equally to the Second Circuit’s treatment of such rights during this era.43  
Most sections of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act have no explicit 
provisions giving private plaintiffs the right to sue,44 and the statutes 
arguably contemplated that the SEC and U.S. Department of Justice would 
have exclusive enforcement powers.  Those agencies were explicitly 
empowered under the statutes to pursue administrative, civil, and criminal 
remedies, while the statutes were silent about private litigation.45  During 
the 1950s and 1960s, federal courts nevertheless recognized private rights 
of action under key provisions, including section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 (the 
general antifraud provision), and section 14(a) (the requirement to abide by 
the SEC’s regulations in soliciting proxies) of the Exchange Act.  The 
Second Circuit had a leading role in creating these implied causes of 
action.46 
In Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co.,47 the Second Circuit 
became the first appellate court in the country to hold that there is an 
 
 38. Id. at 39–40; see, e.g., H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, 
Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV., 501, 554–55 (1986); Donald M. Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to 
Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 88 (1965). 
 39. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–90 (2001); Stabile, supra note 
34, at 865. 
 40. See Foy, supra note 38, at 549–50, 554–56. 
 41. See Roy L. Brooks, Rule 10b-5 in the Balance:  An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 411 (1980). 
 42. 2 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1625–28 (2011). 
 43. Brooks, supra note 41, at 411. 
 44. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 1615 (noting that besides the provision voiding 
contracts in violation of the act under section 29(b), sections 9(e), 16(b), and 18 are the only 
sections of the Exchange Act that have express private civil liability provisions). 
 45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78u (2012); LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 1928–29. 
 46. Brooks, supra note 41, at 411. 
 47. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). 
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implied private right of action for fraud under Rule 10b-5.48  Six years 
earlier, Judge Andrew Kirkpatrick of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
had recognized such an implied right,49 serving as a catalyst for other courts 
around the country.50  When the Second Circuit decided Fischman, Judge 
Jerome Frank took the existence of such an implied right nearly as a given, 
dedicating only two sentences to the issue in the body of the opinion:  
“Section 10(b), to be sure, does not explicitly authorize a civil remedy.  
Since, however, it does make ‘unlawful’ the conduct it describes, it creates 
such a remedy.”51  Judge Frank added a footnote with a lengthy quotation 
from a Yale Law Journal article that argued that Congress had intended to 
create a private right of action under the securities laws.52 
Although the Second Circuit made quick work of creating a private right 
of action under the section 10(b) antifraud provision, it hesitated to expand 
the private right of action to section 14(a), which requires certain 
disclosures in proxy solicitations.  Four years after Fischman, in Subin v. 
Goldsmith,53 a fractured panel affirmed dismissal of claims brought by a 
shareholder under section 14(a).  Judge Harold Medina, in an opinion 
concurring (in part) with the result, argued that “it is at least doubtful that it 
was the intention of the Congress to create any substantive rights by the 
provisions of [s]ection 14(a).”54 
Judge Frank dissented and argued that section 14(a) was no different than 
other sections of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act under which the 
court had already recognized implied private rights of action.55  Judge 
Frank’s Subin dissent soon won out.  In Brown v. Bullock,56 Judge Clark 
predicted that the Second Circuit would have to revisit “the much 
criticized” decision in Howard v. Furst,57 which had reiterated the Subin 
majority’s position.58  The Supreme Court did so first, abrogating Furst in 
its 1964 decision J.I. Case Co. v. Borak59 and adopting Judge Frank’s 
position.60  That holding endures to this day.61 
 
 48. In dicta, Slavin v. Germantown Fire Insurance Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949), 
suggested the existence of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 was suggested. See id.  
However, the Second Circuit was the first appellate court to hold that a private right of 
action actually exists under Rule 10b-5. 
 49. Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946); William C. 
Baskin III, Using Rule 9(b) to Reduce Nuisance Securities Litigation, 99 YALE L.J. 1591, 
1591 n.4 (1990). 
 50. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 590–91 & n.20 (2003). 
 51. Fischman, 188 F.2d at 787. 
 52. See id. at 787 n.4 (quoting The Prospects for Rule X-10b-5:  An Emerging Remedy 
for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1134 (1950)). 
 53. 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 54. Id. at 774 (Medina, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 55. Id. at 765–66 (Frank, J., dissenting). 
 56. 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 57. 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956). 
 58. See Bullock, 294 F.2d at 415, 422 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 59. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).  The Second Circuit acknowledged as much in Studebaker 
Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 60. Borak, 377 U.S. at 435. 
 61. See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104 n.11 (1991). 
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The Second Circuit also played a central role in shaping the territorial 
scope of the private rights of action during the 1960s and 1970s.62  In 
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,63 the Second Circuit found that an American 
investor could sue a foreign issuer under Rule 10b-5 if the conduct 
“has . . . a sufficiently serious effect upon [U.S.] commerce to warrant 
assertion of jurisdiction for the protection of American investors.”64  Four 
years later, in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,65 
Judge Friendly decided that foreign plaintiffs also could seek damages 
under Rule 10b-5 if a substantial amount of the allegedly fraudulent 
conduct occurred in the United States.66  Schoenbaum and Leasco served as 
the twin origins of the “conduct and effects” test to determine the 
extraterritorial scope of 10b-5.67  The other circuits followed the Second 
Circuit’s lead and adopted versions of these tests, with some circuits even 
debating whether each court had “accurately” captured the Second Circuit’s 
jurisprudence.68 
C.  SEC Enforcement 
Even as private remedies under the securities laws expanded, the basic 
authority of the SEC to bring enforcement actions was frequently 
challenged in the years after the securities laws were adopted.69  Due to its 
location, the Second Circuit became the primary arbiter of the SEC’s 
authority—and Second Circuit judges sympathetic to the agency’s goals 
proved useful to the SEC.70  The Second Circuit, tracking the political 
 
 62. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 2026–27 & n.1. 
 63. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 
U.S. 247 (2010). 
 64. Id. at 209. 
 65. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247. 
 66. See id. at 1337. 
 67. The conducts and effects test asks (1) “whether the wrongful conduct had a 
substantial effect in the United States or upon [U.S.] citizens” or (2) whether “substantial 
acts in furtherance of the fraud were committed within the United States.”  See, e.g., SEC v. 
Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247. 
 68. See, e.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 n.10 (7th Cir. 1998), 
abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247.  Of course, both Schoenbaum and Leasco were later 
abrogated by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 561 
U.S. 247 (2010). See infra Part II.D. 
 69. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943) (involving one 
of the earliest SEC enforcement actions); see also R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 
(2d Cir. 1952) (involving a challenge to an SEC order that provided for the suspension of a 
company from membership in the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)); 
Phillips v. SEC, 153 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1946) (involving a challenge to an SEC order 
providing for a change in the capital structure of a corporation). 
 70. See John P. Frank, The Top U.S. Commercial Court, FORTUNE, Jan. 1951, at 92.  In 
the 1940s and 1950s, Judges Clark and Frank provided the SEC with an expertise in 
securities laws that was scarcely paralleled in both the judiciary and the academy.  See supra 
Part II.B for a description of the prowess of Judge Clark in Fischman v. Raytheon 
Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), and the prescience of Judge Frank’s dissent 
in Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1955).  It was little wonder that the Second 
Circuit was considered the best commercial circuit in the country at the time. See James 
Oakes, Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
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economy of the time, granted fairly broad authority to the SEC to protect 
the public against savvier investors that would prey upon them.  This is not 
to say that the Second Circuit provided the SEC with a blank check.71  
Nonetheless, in the aggregate, the Second Circuit served as friend, rather 
than foe, to the SEC in its formative years. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the SEC’s enforcement powers were relatively 
limited until 1990.72  The SEC could enjoin future violations of law and 
seek the equitable assistance of federal courts to obtain disgorgement or 
restitution for violations.73  But the SEC had no power to seek financial 
penalties in most cases.74  When several major financial scandals came to 
light in the 1980s,75 Congress created the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (“the Commission”) to suggest ways in 
which fraud could be reduced.76  The Commission, headed by former SEC 
Commissioner James Treadway, Jr., recommended expanding the 
enforcement remedies allotted to the SEC.77  In response, Congress passed 
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (“the 
Remedies Act”) in 1990, which expanded the SEC’s power to include four 
new classes of penalties, ranging from civil monetary penalties to officer 
and director bars.78 
 
387, 387–88 (1994) (collecting praise of the Second Circuit during Learned Hand’s tenure 
on the court). 
 71. Judge Friendly’s opinion in Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 
1976), is demonstrative of the pragmatic manner in which the Second Circuit dealt with the 
SEC.  Lipper concerned the appeal of a broker, Lipper Corp., from an order by the SEC 
cancelling its registration and barring it from participating in the securities market. Id. at 
173.  Judge Friendly read narrowly an earlier Second Circuit case, Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 
89 (2d Cir. 1940), that had suggested that the Second Circuit lacked power to review 
penalties imposed by the SEC.  He ruled that debarment was “too severe” a sanction and 
modified the sanction to a twelve-month suspension of Lipper’s registration. Id.; see also 
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 583 (2d Cir. 1979) (Kaufman, J., concurring) 
(noting that while the SEC’s “findings and choice of sanctions will often be upheld on 
review,” the “courts have not remained idle” when the SEC goes too far in pursuing its 
objectives); Klein v. SEC, 224 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that an SEC 
disciplinary action against a broker for the violation of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice was 
unsubstantiated and therefore constituted error). 
 72. See Richard A. Spehr & Michelle J. Annunziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen:  
What Is Its Relevance Today?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 587, 588 (2005) (noting the SEC’s 
limited power to impose penalties prior to the passing of the Securities Enforcement 
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990). 
 73. Insider trading was one exception. Id.; see also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that the SEC has no statutory 
authority to seek rescission, restitution, or other forms of equitable monetary relief but may 
seek the equitable assistance of a district court). 
 74. Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 72. 
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of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
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 76. Id. at 388. 
 77. Id. at 388–89. 
 78. See Spehr & Annunziata, supra note 72, at 589 (noting that the four new classes of 
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The Second Circuit suddenly had to adjudicate the legitimacy of the 
SEC’s power in an age where it had a significantly expanded arsenal of 
sanctions at its disposal.79  SEC v. Patel80 is an important example of the 
court’s approach to the most drastic sanction provided by the Remedies 
Act:  the power to prohibit an individual from serving as an officer or 
director of any public company where that person’s conduct “demonstrates 
unfitness to serve as an officer or director.”81  In Patel, appellant-defendant 
Ratilal Patel, founder and director of Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., had 
submitted a misleading application to the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) for approval of a new generic medication.82  A few months before 
the news of this misleading application came to light, Patel sold a 
significant amount of his common stock in Par.83  Once it became public 
knowledge that Patel’s application was misleading, Par’s stock price 
declined appreciably.84  Patel ultimately resigned and pled guilty to 
conspiring to defraud the FDA.85  The SEC then proceeded with its own 
enforcement order in the Southern District of New York, and the district 
court, at the SEC’s urging, imposed various civil penalties upon Patel, 
including an order barring him from serving as an officer or director of a 
public company.86 
Patel appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed the sanctions imposed 
against him.87  Relying on the heightened standard of “substantial 
unfitness” provided in the Remedies Act, the court held that, despite the 
gravity of Patel’s misdeeds, “[t]he loss of livelihood and the stigma 
attached to permanent exclusion from the corporate suite . . . requires 
more.”88  In particular, the court noted that it was essential, in the absence 
of past violations, “that a district court articulate the factual basis for a 
finding of the likelihood of recurrence” necessary to justify the imposition 
of a permanent bar.89 
Patel was quickly seen as a significant decision.  Other circuits adopted 
the Second Circuit’s Patel standard.90  Stephen M. Cutler, director of the 
SEC’s Enforcement Division at the time, criticized the Patel decision for 
creating “a burdensome and overly restrictive test” that placed “an 
unreasonably high” burden on the SEC.91  In response to Patel and other 
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 80. 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 82. Patel, 61 F.3d at 138. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 139. 
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 87. Id. at 142. 
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 90. See, e.g., SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp., 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 91. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. SEC, Remarks at the Glasser Legal 
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decisions applying its principle,92 the SEC reduced the number of cases in 
which it sought officer bars in order to avoid rejection from the courts.93 
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of “substantial fitness” remained 
good law through the early 2000s, when the Internet bubble popped and 
Enron collapsed.  Soon thereafter, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002.94  Sarbanes-Oxley, like the Remedies Act, responded to various 
financial indiscretions by increasing the sanctioning power of the SEC.  
Notably, Sarbanes-Oxley responded to the SEC’s concerns regarding Patel 
by lowering the standard for entering a suspension or bar order from a 
“substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director” to merely 
“unfitness” to perform such roles.95  In other words, the Second Circuit’s 
Patel decision helped spur Congress to give the SEC more power to deal 
effectively with financial indiscretion.  Congress further expanded the 
SEC’s power in enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act96 in 2010, arguably the most impactful piece of 
regulatory legislation since the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 
In contrast to its holding narrowing the punitive purview of the SEC in 
Patel, the Second Circuit upheld and even expanded the power of district 
courts to fashion other equitable remedies.  In SEC v. First Jersey Security, 
Inc.,97 the court made clear that district courts have broad discretion in 
fashioning equitable remedies for securities violations.98  First Jersey 
concerned a company that had induced its customers to buy various 
securities from the firm at excessive prices through fraudulent practices.99  
The SEC initiated an enforcement action against the company, and a bench 
trial followed in the Southern District of New York.100  The district court 
held the defendants liable for federal securities law violations and enjoined 
future violations, ordered disgorgement of unlawful gains, and assessed 
prejudgment interest.101  On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld nearly all of 
the district court’s sanctions, noting that once a “district court has found 
federal securities law violations, it has broad equitable power to fashion 
 
 92. See, e.g., SEC v. McCaskey, No. 98-cv-6153 (SWK), 2001 WL 1029053, at *6 
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appropriate remedies.”102  The Second Circuit’s ruling in First Jersey 
demonstrates that, while it was loath to allow the imposition of a penalty as 
severe as the permanent bar without significant justification, it did allow 
courts relative freedom otherwise in fashioning equitable relief. 
The Second Circuit’s role in close oversight of the SEC’s enforcement 
power continues to this day.  Like many civil and criminal actions filed in 
the federal courts, many SEC investigations never reach the point of 
enforcement but rather settle before they even reach the courts.103  An 
important tool in the SEC’s arsenal has been the “no admit, no deny” 
consent agreement—in which the defendant agrees to certain penalties 
without admitting or denying wrongdoing.104  For many years, courts often 
approved consent agreements after a cursory review and without probing 
the appropriateness of such a settlement.105 
The supremacy of the “no admit, no deny” model has been shaken 
recently, both by the SEC and in some courts.  In 2013, the SEC changed its 
policy on these settlements by expanding the categories and circumstances 
in which the SEC would demand admissions from defendants.106  And in 
SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,107 Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern 
District of New York refused to approve a “no admit, no deny” proposed 
consent agreement between the SEC and Citigroup on the grounds that the 
agreement was “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public 
interest” because Citigroup did not have to accept responsibility for the loss 
it caused investors.108 
The Second Circuit reversed Judge Rakoff’s decision.109  The court held 
that Judge Rakoff had abused his discretion in requiring that the SEC 
“establish the ‘truth’ of the allegations against a settling party as a condition 
for approving the consent decrees.”110  Moreover, the court determined that 
the business of determining the public interest “rests squarely with the 
SEC,” not the courts.111  Thus, Citigroup reiterated that the SEC could still 
count on deference from the Second Circuit when it came to negotiating 
consent agreements.  Just as the Second Circuit had granted the SEC 
significant deference in the aftermath of the Great Depression, Citigroup 
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demonstrates that the court continues to afford such deference well after the 
Great Recession.112 
D.  Reining In Private Securities Fraud Cases 
The Second Circuit’s jurisprudence creating private rights of actions 
under the securities laws eventually led to a sharp rise in the number of 
Rule 10b-5 fraud lawsuits.113  The proliferation of securities fraud suits 
raised concerns that the securities laws were inviting frivolous lawsuits 
(colloquially termed “strike suits”)114 and that plaintiffs’ allegations often 
amounted to “fraud by hindsight.”115  Corporations would settle even 
frivolous cases because of the huge costs required to litigate such suits.116 
These factors led the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit to rein in 
private lawsuits starting in 1975.  That year, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores,117 the Supreme Court adopted the Second Circuit’s holding 
from Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.118 that only actual purchasers and 
sellers of a security could sue under Rule 10b-5.119  The Second Circuit’s 
impact could be felt throughout the Supreme Court’s opinion.  In the 
majority opinion, Justice William Rehnquist noted that the Second Circuit’s 
Birnbaum panel consisted of Chief Judge Thomas Swan and Judges 
Learned Hand and Augustus Hand, and that “virtually all” lower courts had 
adopted the rule.120  Even in dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun 
acknowledged that the Birnbaum decision “was pronounced by a justifiably 
esteemed panel of that Court of Appeals regarded as the ‘Mother Court’ in 
this area of the law.”121 
In two other decisions of the same period, the Supreme Court curtailed 
some of the Second Circuit’s securities jurisprudence as part of its broader 
efforts to narrow the scope of the private right of action.  In Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder,122 the Supreme Court held that private plaintiffs must show 
scienter, not merely negligence, for Rule 10b-5 civil liability—a shift 
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toward the views expressed in Judge Friendly’s well-known SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co.123 concurrence.124  Likewise, in another reversal of a 
Second Circuit decision, the Supreme Court found in Santa Fe Industries v. 
Green125 that “corporate mismanagement” alone is not actionable under 
Rule 10b-5.126 
Beginning in the late 1970s, the Second Circuit, sharing the Supreme 
Court’s increasing concerns about frivolous private security actions, began 
to narrow the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 by requiring 
plaintiffs in the early stages of litigation to plead their claims with 
heightened particularity to avoid dismissal.127  Understanding this shift 
requires some historical explanation.  In the early nineteenth century, courts 
demanded that plaintiffs plead their claims in a new lawsuit using precise, 
highly stylized language.128  Dissatisfied with this emphasis on 
technicalities, legislatures began enacting statutory rules of procedure that 
banned excessive formalism.  For example, New York’s Field Code, 
adopted in 1848, merely required pleadings at the outset of the lawsuit to 
include “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in 
ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as 
to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.”129 
Despite these new statutory rules, courts continued to emphasize 
formality, and pleading continued to serve as a confusing trap for the 
unwary.130  To break from this extreme formalism, Judge Charles Clark, 
then dean of Yale Law School, and the other drafters of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) ultimately decided to require plaintiffs to file 
nothing more than “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.”131  But, in a compromise, the drafters 
required more of plaintiffs seeking to bring fraud claims, because of the 
frequency of strike suits alleging fraud.  Under Rule 9(b) of the FRCP, a 
plaintiff bringing a fraud claim must “state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”132 
When applying these rules, courts have long debated the proper balance 
between allowing vague claims to proceed to burdensome discovery and the 
risk that meritorious lawsuits will be dismissed.133  Judge Jerome Frank 
championed very lenient pleading requirements.  In his Subin dissent, Frank 
warned against “revert[ing] to the days when courts construed pleadings 
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with what today courts consider unreasonable strictness.”134  He rejected 
the notion that shareholder lawsuits should be treated any differently: 
An economy like ours, which thrives on the fact that thousands of persons 
of modest means invest in corporate shares, will be poorly served if our 
courts regard with suspicion all minority stockholders’ suits, and 
therefore, out of a desire to discourage such suits, apply to them unusually 
strict pleading rules . . . .  The unfortunate consequence will be that those 
in control may be immunized from effective attacks on their misdeeds, 
and, as a result, the small investors will lose confidence in all corporate 
managements, the honest as well as the dishonest.135 
The standard, Judge Frank argued, should only be whether “the plaintiff 
would be entitled to no relief under any set of facts which could be 
proved.”136  For Judge Frank, the heightened pleadings standard under Rule 
9(b) played no role in securities lawsuits and, even if it did, its effect was 
limited.137 
With the flood of Rule 10b-5 lawsuits, the Second Circuit turned sharply 
away from the “no set of facts” standard of review.  In Ross v. A.H. Robins 
Co.,138 the Second Circuit substituted in a new pleading standard for 
securities suits, holding that under Rule 9(b) a plaintiff must “specifically 
plead those events which they assert give rise to a strong inference [of 
scienter].”139  Drawing upon the Supreme Court’s language in Blue Chip 
Stamps, the Second Circuit found that the heightened pleading standard  
diminish[es] the possibility that “a plaintiff with a largely groundless 
claim [will be able] to simply take up the time of a number of other 
people [by extensive discovery] with the right to do so representing an in 
terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonable 
founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence.”140 
This so-called “strong inference of scienter standard” eventually developed 
into a two-part test, which required a plaintiff (1) to “alleg[e] facts to show 
that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud” or (2) to 
“alleg[e] facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious 
misbehavior or recklessness.”141 
While two other circuits adopted the Second Circuit’s “strong inference” 
standard, other courts declined to do so.142  Those courts maintained that 
the Second Circuit’s strong inference test contradicted Rule 9(b)’s plain 
 
 134. Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 764 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 767. 
 136. Id. at 764. 
 137. Id. at 766. 
 138. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 139. Id. at 558. 
 140. Id. at 557 (quoting Denny v. Barber 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 141. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); PERINO, supra 
note 133, at 3–11. 
 142. See, e.g., In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1543 (9th Cir. 1994) (en 
banc), superseded by statute as recognized in Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 437 n.6 (9th 
Cir. 2001); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989); 
PERINO, supra note 133, at 3–15. 
240 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
language that  “intent . . . may be alleged generally.”143  Another group of 
courts purported to adopt the Second Circuit’s strong inference standard, 
but in practice applied the standard with less rigor.144 
But the Second Circuit’s approach ultimately won out when Congress 
intervened in 1995 with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA).  To curb abusive securities lawsuits and to achieve uniformity 
among the circuits, the PSLRA adopted the Second Circuit’s strong 
inference of scienter standard as a statutory pleading requirement in all 
securities fraud cases.  Hence, all plaintiffs bringing securities fraud claims 
now must plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”145 
Since the enactment of the PSLRA, much debate has centered over how 
to treat the Second Circuit’s earlier jurisprudence—especially the Second 
Circuit’s still uncodified two-part test—in giving meaning to the PSLRA’s 
strong inference standard.  In Novak v. Kasaks,146 the Second Circuit found 
that the PSLRA did not substantially change the Second Circuit’s pleading 
standard.147  While Novak disclaimed any rigid reliance on “magic words 
such as ‘motive and opportunity,’” the court concluded that its prior 
jurisprudence could prove “helpful” in determining what allegations meet 
the strong inference of scienter standard.148  Thus, with the adoption of the 
PSLRA, the Second Circuit’s influence in this area lives on. 
Another example of the Second Circuit limiting the scope of the private 
right of action concerns the extraterritorial application of securities laws.  In 
2010, forty-two years after Schoenbaum, the Supreme Court, in Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank,149 put an end to the Second Circuit’s “conduct and 
effects” test by limiting the circumstances in which foreign investors could 
make use of the securities laws to sue over foreign-based conduct.150  Yet 
even there, the Second Circuit and Judge Friendly took center stage.  In his 
concurrence, Justice Stevens called the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects 
test the “north star” coming from the “‘Mother Court’ of securities law” 
which has “tended to [the] oak” that grew from the “acorn” of Rule 
10b-5.151  Justice Stevens heaped his greatest praise on Judge Friendly, the 
author of Leasco, who he termed “the master arborist.”152 
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Since Morrison, the Second Circuit has begun to develop a new body of 
law delimiting the territorial scope of the securities laws.  In Parkcentral 
Global Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Automobile Holdings,153 the Second Circuit 
concluded that a transaction in the United States was necessary, but not 
sufficient, for a private plaintiff to seek redress under Rule 10b-5 for 
securities not registered on a U.S. exchange.154  The decision addressed 
securities-based swap agreements—transactions designed to simulate the 
purchase and short sale of a stock between two counterparties, without 
either party needing to own the actual security.  The parties to the swap 
simply select a reference price and agree to exchange money (as opposed to 
the stock itself) based on the stock’s subsequent performance.155  The 
swaps in Parkcentral Global Hub were executed in the United States, but 
the allegedly tortious conduct affecting the stock’s price occurred abroad, 
and the security was not traded on a U.S. exchange.156  The Second Circuit 
concluded that, although the swap parties effectuated the transactions in the 
United States, “the dominance of the foreign elements” foreclosed 
Rule 10b-5 private liability.157  In finding for the defendants, the Second 
Circuit declined to establish a bright-line test for determining whether a 
transaction is sufficiently domestic, but left the issue open for future 
development.158 
II.  CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITIES LAWS 
The Second Circuit’s preeminence in securities regulation is also 
reflected in its criminal jurisprudence in this area.  Second Circuit decisions 
sustaining criminal convictions for financial crimes have played a key role 
in making criminal prosecution for corporate malfeasance a real weapon. 
A.  Scienter and Criminal Intent 
One important question that the Second Circuit addressed in a series of 
cases is the meaning of “scienter” in criminal cases.  “Scienter” is a legal 
term that refers to an actor’s “intent” or “knowledge.”  To convict a 
defendant of a financial crime, the government generally must prove that 
the defendant acted with scienter, for example, wrongful intent.  Difficult 
questions sometimes arise as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to 
impose criminal liability in situations where the violation was inadvertent 
and the offender has no readily ascertainable motive. 
In 1969, Judge Henry Friendly’s opinion in United States v. Simon159 
became one of the first cases to attempt to define what constitutes a 
“willful” and “knowing” misstatement of fact sufficient for criminal 
liability under the Exchange Act.  The defendants in Simon were three 
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accountants at Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, a leading public 
accounting firm, who had been convicted of securities fraud for creating, 
certifying, and subsequently mailing false and misleading financial 
statements for a client of theirs.160  The defendants argued that they had 
complied with the literal  terms of the General Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and that compliance alone was sufficient to preclude 
any finding that they had intentionally violated the securities laws.161  The 
court rejected this argument, and found that even an accountant who 
complies with GAAP can be liable if the financial statements create a false 
or misleading impression.162 
In the wake of Simon, a number of other circuits concluded that 
following GAAP was not sufficient to shield an accountant from 
liability.163  In a 2002 statement discussing the massive Enron accounting 
fraud, then-SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt explained that 
the first principle should always be the one Judge Henry Friendly 
articulated four decades ago in the Lybrand Ross criminal case, [United 
States] v. Simon. . . .  [I]f literal compliance with GAAP creates a 
fraudulent or materially misleading impression in the minds of 
shareholders, the accountants could, and would, be held criminally 
liable.164 
Simon ultimately resulted in efforts to develop more detailed accounting 
guidelines.165 
Judge Friendly authored opinions in two additional widely cited cases 
that established that it is no defense that the defendant did not know the 
precise contours of the regulation that he violated.166  In United States v. 
Peltz,167 the defendant learned from a connection of his at the SEC that the 
Commission intended to file charges against Georgia Pacific 
Corporation.168  He then shorted Georgia Pacific’s stock169 and caused his 
broker to violate Rule 10a-1(a) (“the down-tick rule”)—which prohibits a 
short sale at a price lower than the last reported price—by falsely telling his 
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broker that he was selling to unwind a long position he owned in the stock, 
rather than to establish a new short position.170  Peltz claimed that he had 
no knowledge of the down-tick rule, and further, that he did not explicitly 
instruct the broker to make a short sale.171  But, in affirming his conviction, 
the Second Circuit explained that the language of section 32(a) of the 
Exchange Act makes clear that “[a] person can willfully violate an SEC rule 
even if he does not know of its existence.”172  The court reasoned that Peltz 
“willfully” violated the down-tick rule, because his wrongful act of telling 
the broker that he was long particular stocks, when he knew that was 
untrue, created a “serious risk” that the rule would be violated:  the broker 
had no way of knowing that the down-tick rule applied to the sales Peltz 
was making.173 
In United States v. Dixon,174 the Second Circuit further clarified the state 
of mind necessary for criminal liability.175  Lloyd Dixon, Jr., the president 
of AVM Corporation, the largest producer of mechanical voting machines 
in the United States, was charged with failing to disclose personal loans he 
had received from the corporation, in violation of SEC rules that require 
such disclosures in proxy solicitations.176  On appeal to the Second Circuit, 
Dixon argued that he did not know he was required to disclose the loans 
under the SEC rules and thus did not “willfully” violate the rules.177  In 
affirming Dixon’s conviction, Judge Friendly’s opinion for the court 
emphasized that Dixon had engaged in a wrongful act when he manipulated 
the corporate books to make his own debts look as though they had 
belonged to someone else, and he reasoned that this kind of wrongful act 
fell squarely within the ambit of section 32(a) because it led “to the very 
violations that would have been prevented if the defendant had acted with 
the aim of scrupulously obeying the rules . . . rather than of avoiding 
them.”178 
The scienter standard the Second Circuit developed in these cases was 
widely adopted.179  For example, in United States v. O’Hagan,180 the 
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Eighth Circuit relied heavily on Dixon’s interpretation of “willfully” to 
conclude that a defendant could be criminally liable for insider trading 
based only on “the intentional doing of the wrongful acts—no knowledge of 
the rule or regulation is required.”181  In fact, O’Hagan argued that he could 
not have known his conduct was unlawful because it implicated the 
“misappropriation theory” of insider trading, which was first recognized by 
the Supreme Court in that very case.182  Despite this, the Eighth Circuit 
relied on Dixon and held that criminal liability did not require proof that the 
person knew of the rule that made his act illegal.183 
B.  Procedural Protections in Civil Enforcement Cases 
Preceding Criminal Charges 
One complication of criminal securities fraud cases is that they often 
coincide with simultaneous civil proceedings.  This has sometimes raised 
questions about how to protect the right of the accused to remain silent in 
the criminal proceedings while civil proceedings are also pending (in which 
the accused does not have the same right against self-incrimination). 
This question is particularly complex because civil proceedings of an 
enforcement nature sometimes involve nongovernmental entities.  
Oversight of the securities market in the United States has always relied 
heavily on self-regulation by private actors.  The NYSE was officially 
formed in 1817 and, from its inception, was permitted to “regulate its 
members as it saw fit.”184  In 1983, Congress amended the Exchange Act to 
require almost every SEC-registered brokerage firm to become a member of 
a national securities association or a registered exchange.185  Because Self-
Regulatory Organizations (SROs), such as the NYSE and the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) have their own procedures for 
investigating and disciplining members for violations, a number of 
complicated questions have arisen in SRO proceedings.  The Second Circuit 
has led the way in considering the appropriate role of self-regulation in 
securities law. 
United States v. Solomon186 is considered to be “[t]he cornerstone federal 
decision that analyzes a claim of a privilege against self-incrimination in the 
context of a Self-Regulatory [O]rganization’s investigation.”187  In his 
opinion for the court, Judge Friendly explained that where the NYSE acts or 
investigates “in pursuance of its own interests and obligations, not as an 
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agent of the [government],” it is not a “state actor” under the Fifth 
Amendment.188  Accordingly, an individual is not entitled to the privilege 
against self-incrimination in an NYSE interrogation—even if his testimony 
is later used against him in a criminal prosecution.  A number of other 
circuits have relied on the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Solomon to 
conclude that other SROs were not state actors.  For example, in United 
States v. Stevens,189 the Ninth Circuit relied on Judge Friendly’s opinion to 
conclude that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to 
investigators working for an FDIC-insured bank.190  The Seventh Circuit in 
Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co.191 similarly relied on Judge Friendly’s 
reasoning in Solomon to conclude that the privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.192 
Where an individual has violated a rule promulgated by the SRO of 
which he is a member, what effect should such a violation have on his 
potential criminal liability under the securities laws?  In United States v. 
Finnerty,193 the Second Circuit explained that a violation of a NYSE rule 
was not tantamount to a violation of the securities laws.  The defendant in 
Finnerty was a “specialist” member of the NYSE, meaning that he was the 
designated auctioneer for a specific security.  Finnerty engaged in the 
practice of “interpositioning,” in violation of NYSE rules.194  The Second 
Circuit reasoned that the NYSE rules did not represent a reasonable 
assurance by Finnerty, to his customers, that he would not engage in 
interpositioning—and thus he had not committed a  “deceptive act” within 
the meaning of section 10(b) merely by violating the rules against 
interpositioning.195 
Finnerty had important implications for the entire specialist system.196  
In the early 2000s, the SEC brought a number of actions against each of the 
NYSE specialist firms for violations of SEC Rules 11b-1 and 10b-5, 
resulting in administrative settlements of more than $247 million.197  But 
 
 188. Solomon, 509 F.2d at 869. 
 189. 601 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 190. Id. at 1078. 
 191. 738 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 192. Id. at 186. 
 193. 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 194. Under NYSE Rule 104, traders generally were not allowed to engage in proprietary 
trades.  When there were two matching orders from different members to the public seeking 
to buy and sell a security, Finnerty was required, under the rules, to match the public orders.  
Instead of doing so, he interposed himself between the orders—selling shares from his own 
account to the member of the public who was seeking to buy, and simultaneously buying 
shares at a lower price for his own account from the member of the public who was seeking 
to sell.  As a result, instead of giving the members of the public a better price, he collected a 
“spread” for himself, reflecting the difference in the price he paid and received on the two 
orders from members of the public. Id. at 145. 
 195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 196. One commenter noted that “by declining to apply Rule 10b-5 to a case of sizeable 
Specialist profits, the Finnerty decision . . . dampened the death knell for the Specialist 
system.”  J. Scott Colesanti, Not Dead Yet:  How New York’s Finnerty Decision Salvaged the 
Stock Exchange Specialist, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMM. 1, 30 (2008). 
 197. See id. at 14. 
246 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
shortly after the Second Circuit’s decision in Finnerty, the U.S. Attorney 
for the Southern District of New York dropped all charges in five specialist 
cases that were still pending, explaining that “continued prosecution in 
these cases are not in the interests of justice.”198  The Second Circuit’s 
jurisprudence had won out again. 
C.  Development of the “Misappropriation Theory” 
of Insider Trading 
Neither the Securities Act nor the Exchange Act explicitly prohibits 
individuals from trading on the basis of nonpublic information that would 
be material to the reasonable investor.  Indeed, trading on inside 
information was not even prohibited in most jurisdictions at the time the 
acts were passed.199  But from the early days of the securities laws, the SEC 
and the courts have recognized that “insider trading” is a kind of securities 
fraud.  The SEC’s decision in Cady, Roberts & Co.200 was the first to 
recognize liability for insider trading, reasoning that “the inherent 
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information 
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing” was a sufficient 
basis to hold the violator liable.201 
Many of the major legal theories which serve as the foundation of insider 
trading law nationwide have roots in Second Circuit jurisprudence.  The 
Second Circuit was the first court to adopt the “classical theory” of insider 
trading in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.202  The defendants in this case 
were corporate insiders who had nonpublic information that Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., a mining company, had discovered an unusually large deposit 
of copper.  Based on this information, the defendants bought securities in 
the company.  The company’s stock price rose soon after the news was 
released, netting the defendants a substantial profit.  At the SEC’s urging, 
the Second Circuit adopted the reasoning of Cady, Roberts to find the 
defendants liable under the securities laws.  The Second Circuit’s holding 
was cited soon thereafter by nearly all of the circuits for the proposition that 
fraud and deceit under the Exchange Act included the failure of a corporate 
insider to disclose material nonpublic information to a purchaser or seller 
before selling or buying a security.203 
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Moreover, the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur articulated a test of 
what constitutes material information that would later be adopted by the 
Supreme Court.  The Texas Gulf Sulphur Court held that material 
information includes “facts which affect the probable future of the company 
and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the 
company’s securities.”204  This test was expressly adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Basic v. Levinson,205 and the Court’s opinion influenced how 
subsequent courts interpreted the disclosure duties of public companies 
under the securities laws.206 
The Second Circuit was also one of the first courts to expand insider 
trading liability beyond corporate insiders.  Unlike the Texas Gulf Sulphur 
defendants, Vincent Chiarella was not a corporate insider.207  He was 
neither wealthy nor well connected—in fact, he was a working class 
individual employed by a printing firm, Pandick Press, to set the typeface 
and page layouts for various printer jobs, including merger agreements.208  
Through his position, however, Chiarella was exposed to highly sensitive 
and confidential information about mergers and acquisitions.  Although the 
names of the buying and target corporations were never stated explicitly, 
Chiarella often was able to decipher the actual name of a target company 
from its code name.  Knowing that the target company’s stock price would 
rise after announcement of the merger, he bought stock in USM Corp. after 
deciphering the target company’s name from five separate takeover bids for 
the company.  Chiarella made a substantial profit, but the government 
indicted him on an insider trading theory.209 
Chiarella argued that he could not be found liable for insider trading 
because he was not an insider of the company in which he bought stocks 
and had no fiduciary obligation to deal fairly with the sellers of the stock.  
Judge Irving Kaufmann, writing for the majority in United States v. 
Chiarella,210 rejected his argument, reasoning that liability under the 
securities laws was not limited to corporate insiders per se but instead 
extended to all market insiders—that is, those who regularly receive 
material information not available to the public as a result of their 
employment.  Chiarella’s breach of a fiduciary duty he owed to his 
employer, who entrusted Chiarella with this sensitive information, was 
sufficient to sweep Chiarella within the ambit of the securities regulations.  
Judge Thomas Meskill, in dissent, argued that Chiarella could not be found 
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liable under securities regulations because there was no fraud211:  Chiarella 
owed no duty to speak because he had no fiduciary relationship with USM 
Corp.’s stockholders.  Judge Meskill ultimately won the day, as the 
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision and Chiarella’s 
conviction, relying on Judge Meskill’s reasoning in his dissent.212 
Although ultimately reversed, the Second Circuit’s Chiarella decision 
would serve as the first seed for a second theory of insider trading 
liability—the “misappropriation theory.”  Unlike the classical theory of 
insider trading, liability under the misappropriation theory does not require 
that the individual be a corporate insider who breaches a fiduciary duty to 
her corporation by trading on the basis of material nonpublic information.  
Liability under the misappropriation theory is based on an individual’s 
breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of confidential information that is 
subsequently traded upon.  Indeed, Justice Stevens’s Chiarella concurrence 
noted that the Supreme Court left open the question of whether insider 
trading liability could extend to instances where an individual 
misappropriates confidential information from an employer for personal 
benefit, even where that individual was not a “corporate insider.”  While the 
Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative in United States v. 
O’Hagan213 almost twenty years later, the Second Circuit had, by that time, 
already developed a well-plowed misappropriation theory jurisprudence. 
If Chiarella was the seedling that laid the groundwork for the 
misappropriation theory, United States v. Newman214—the first case to 
explicitly adopt the misappropriation theory—was the tree that grew from 
it.  James Newman was part of a group (along with Jacques Courtois, 
Franklin Carniol, and Constantine Spyropoulos) that, from 1973 through 
1978, devised a scheme to use confidential information for the purposes of 
securities trading.  Courtois and another individual, Adrian Antoniu, would 
misappropriate confidential information concerning proposed mergers and 
acquisitions from their employers, Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb.215  
Courtois and Antoniu then would pass on that confidential information to 
Newman, a securities trader, who would pass the information to Carniol and 
Spyropoulos, both residents of foreign countries, who used the information 
to purchase securities through secret foreign bank accounts and trusts.216 
Like Chiarella, Newman was not a corporate insider who fit within the 
classical definition of insider trading.  The Second Circuit, accordingly, 
could have dismissed the charges against him on the ground that he owed 
no fiduciary duty to shareholders, as the district court had done.  Instead, 
the Second Circuit panel took the opportunity to revisit the 
misappropriation theory, noting that the Supreme Court had not yet 
addressed whether insider trading liability could extend to corporate 
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outsiders who misappropriated confidential information.217  The court 
concluded that, by stealing information from his employer, Newman 
engaged in deceitful conduct subject to insider trading liability.  Newman’s 
act of profiting from that conduct by passing the stolen information along to 
others who would purchase securities based on that information, in the 
Second Circuit’s opinion, involved a core violation of the securities laws.218  
The Newman decision would come to be seen as the first case to seriously 
develop and embrace the misappropriation theory of insider trading 
liability.219  The House Report on the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984 refers repeatedly to the misappropriation theory, citing Newman.220  
References to the misappropriation theory also appear in the legislative 
history of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988, where Congress “explicitly revised the private right of action 
provision for the purpose of giving standing to . . . traders injured by 
violations of the misappropriation theory.”221 
The Second Circuit expanded the scope of misappropriation liability in 
United States v. Carpenter,222  where the court held that a breach of a 
fiduciary duty to an employer who owed a duty to other clients was not 
necessary to the misappropriation theory.223  Rather, the circuit found that 
the misappropriation theory was premised on the fact that information was 
stolen—regardless of whether the employer had a fiduciary duty to keep 
information confidential.  The Second Circuit thus successfully extended 
the power of the securities laws to govern not only corporate insiders, but 
any employee with access to material nonpublic information.  Carpenter 
thus represents the final break from the traditional requirement that there 
exist some fiduciary duty between the trader and the target corporation.224 
The facts of United States v. Chestman225 caused the Second Circuit to 
rein in the expansion of the misappropriation theory.  Robert Chestman was 
convicted of receiving and trading on material nonpublic information he 
received from Keith Loeb, husband to Susan, the niece of a wealthy 
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entrepreneur, Ira Waldbaum.  Ira Waldbaum had substantial holdings in 
Waldbaum’s, a large and successful grocery chain that was to be purchased 
by another company at a price double its current market value.  Ira had 
informed his sister, Shirley, of the pending transaction, who, despite Ira’s 
instructions to the contrary, told her daughter Susan of the transaction.  
When Susan told her husband, Loeb, about the upcoming transaction, he 
immediately informed Chestman, who thereafter purchased stock in 
Waldbaum’s.226  Chestman, unlike Carpenter, did not actually 
misappropriate any information—he only received that information from 
Loeb, who received it from his wife.  As a result, the Second Circuit held 
that the misappropriation theory did not cover his conduct.  The majority 
refused to hold that family members owe a fiduciary duty to one another.  
Thus, because Keith Loeb could not have breached a fiduciary duty to his 
family members, Chestman could not be held liable under the securities 
regulations.227 
Judge Ralph Winter dissented.  He contended that the court should have 
found that a fiduciary duty among family members could exist in the 
context of a family-controlled corporation, like Waldbaum’s.  Although 
rejected by the majority, Judge Winter’s analysis ultimately won the day.  
His analysis was subsequently adopted by other circuits.228  Furthermore, 
the SEC later amended the regulation concerning fraudulent and deceitful 
securities transactions and cited Judge Winter’s analysis in creating a 
fiduciary duty not to disclose confidential information to other family 
members.229 
The Second Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Newman230 is 
likely to be just as influential.  Newman concerned the appeal of two hedge 
fund managers, Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, who allegedly 
traded based on information about the quarterly earnings of Dell and 
NVIDIA that they received through a tipping chain.231  Newman and 
Chiasson were several steps removed from the insiders who disclosed the 
information.  Although the Supreme Court had previously held that the 
government was required to prove that a “tippee” knew that the “tipper” had 
breached his duty of confidentiality,232 it had not addressed whether those 
who received the information also had to know the tipper himself benefited 
from the breach in order to be found liable.  The Second Circuit reversed 
the defendants’ convictions, holding that the government did indeed have to 
show that the tippee knew that the tipper benefited from the breach.  The 
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Second Circuit also articulated a narrower view of what could constitute a 
personal benefit than what the government had urged.  It rejected the 
government’s argument that mere friendship could suffice and held that the 
benefit received by the tipper “must be of some consequence.”233  With this 
decision, the Second Circuit significantly pruned the government’s ability 
to prosecute remote tippees.234 
D.  Decades of Scandals:  Insider Trading 
in the 1980s and the Dot-Com Era 
Given the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction over Wall Street, it is little 
surprise that many of the most notorious financial scandals of recent 
decades have found their way to the Second Circuit’s docket.  One of the 
most notorious was the Drexel Burnham Lambert insider trading scandal, a 
defining moment of the 1980s.  The key player in the scandal was Michael 
Milken, the so-called “Junk Bond King,” a Drexel executive with an 
outsized personality and ego.235  Milken successfully revolutionized the 
non-investment-grade (“junk”) bond market,236 by pioneering a strategy in 
which corporate raiders issued junk bonds to finance corporate takeovers.237  
After corporate raiders (such as Ivan Boesky) issued junk bonds 
underwritten by Drexel, Milken would orchestrate a series of transactions 
designed to artificially prop up the value of the bonds and to conceal 
weaknesses in the underlying assets.238  In a separate part of the scheme, 
Boesky and others often traded on nonpublic information and shared “tips” 
about impending mergers or acquisitions that could cause huge swings in 
the stock price.239  Boesky, Milken, and several other key players 
(including Dennis Levine, Robert Freeman, and Martin Siegel) were all 
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convicted of crimes involving illicit trading.240  The Second Circuit was the 
final arbiter of their appeals (which were generally rejected).241 
The Second Circuit also saw a wave of insider trading cases after the 
2009 financial crisis, including the prosecution of Raj Rajaratnam, founder 
of the Galleon Group, and Rajat Gupta, a member of Goldman Sachs’s 
board of directors.242  On the afternoon of September 23, 2008, Goldman 
Sachs held a meeting of its board of directors to approve an investment 
from Warren Buffett of $5 billion in Goldman.243  The company was set to 
announce the investment at 4:00 p.m.  At 3:54 p.m., Gupta’s assistant 
placed a call to Rajaratnam’s direct line and connected him to Gupta.  
Rajaratnam then instructed several of his fellow traders to begin buying 
Goldman stock.  The Galleon Group purchased $33 million worth of stock 
and made over $1 million when Goldman’s stock rose nearly 7 percent the 
morning after the announcement.244 
Gupta was convicted on four of six counts, including securities fraud, and 
was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment.245  Rajaratnam was 
convicted on nine counts of securities fraud and five counts of conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud,246 and was sentenced to 132 months’ 
imprisonment and ordered to pay over $60 million in fines—the largest 
sentence ever handed down in the history of insider trading prosecutions.247  
The Second Circuit upheld both convictions on appeal.248  In the aftermath 
of the Great Recession, the federal courts in New York sentenced nearly 80 
percent of convicted insider traders to prison and the median sentence rose 
from eleven months in the 1990s to two-and-a-half years in recent years.249  
The government, with the help of careful appellate review by the Second 
Circuit, had once again cracked down on the boldest wrongdoers in the 
aftermath of a severe recession. 
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III.  IMPORTANT BANKING LAW DECISIONS 
Given New York’s importance as a financial center,250 the Second 
Circuit has handled not just securities regulation but a wide array of issues 
concerning the banking industry and the propriety of banks’ activities.  
Disputes about the nature of banks and what they should be allowed to do 
are as old as the country itself.251  In 1819, Justice John Marshall, writing 
for the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland,252 recognized that “the 
happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends” upon banks to 
facilitate commerce and industry.253 
Many disputes about the powers and limitations of banks involve the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which attempted to improve the safety of 
commercial banks by precluding them from engaging in risky financing 
activities.  Prior to the twentieth century, national commercial banks had 
been prohibited from underwriting securities.254  But because many state 
banks were permitted by state law to underwrite securities, in the early part 
of the twentieth century, national banks could circumvent the prohibition on 
underwriting by affiliating themselves with state banks.255  Congress 
approved such arrangements, with the blessing of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, through the McFadden Act of 1927.256 
After the stock market crash of 1929, and the subsequent economic 
depression, approximately 5,000 banks failed—creating concerns that 
commercial banks had become too exposed to the risks of the stock market 
and the broader economy.257  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was designed 
to increase the safety of commercial banks by separating “Main Street” 
commercial banks from Wall Street investment banks.  Commercial banks 
with federal deposit insurance were permitted to engage only in “the 
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business of banking” and “closely related” activities,258 and were expressly 
precluded from engaging in risky financing activities such as underwriting 
securities, owning stocks, or affiliating with firms “engaged principally” in 
underwriting.259 
This legislation introduced difficult line-drawing problems.  The broad 
language used in the statute left considerable room for federal banking 
regulators to determine what constitutes “the business of banking” and what 
activities were impermissible.260  Although banking regulators strictly 
limited the activities of commercial banks in the decades following the 
passage of Glass-Steagall, starting in the 1980s there was a broad push to 
reduce unnecessary government regulation—which extended, under 
President Reagan’s tenure, to a “comprehensive program of financial 
deregulation.”261  The financial industry of the late 1980s looked nothing 
like the one that existed when Glass-Steagall was first adopted after the 
stock market crash of 1929.262  As Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board 
of the Federal Reserve, put it, “the financial system ha[d] evolved beyond 
the terms of our laws and [wa]s functioning without effective legislative 
guidelines.”263  In that context, federal regulators began to relax some of the 
restrictions on commercial banks that had prevailed since the Great 
Depression.  In a trio of cases, the Securities Industry Association, a 
national trade association of broker-dealers, challenged decisions by federal 
banking regulators to allow commercial banks to engage in securities-
related activities.  The Second Circuit uniformly deferred to the judgment 
of the banking regulators on these issues. 
For example, in Securities Industry Ass’n v. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System,264 the Federal Reserve Board permitted Bank 
America Corporation to acquire the Charles Schwab Corporation—the 
nation’s largest discount brokerage firm at the time.265  In a decision later 
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affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit rejected the Securities 
Industry Association’s challenge and upheld the Federal Reserve Board’s 
determination.266  The Second Circuit viewed Glass-Steagall as primarily 
intended to prevent banks from investing their assets in risky securities like 
stocks that could jeopardize the bank’s solvency in the event of a market 
downturn.267  Because Schwab acted only as an agent for customers, and 
did not commit its own capital to risky investments, and because Schwab’s 
revenue from customers “depend[ed] solely on the volume of shares 
traded . . . not . . . the sale or purchase of specific securities,” the Second 
Circuit agreed with the Federal Reserve Board that a commercial bank 
could acquire Schwab.268 
Five years later, the Second Circuit upheld Federal Reserve Board orders 
allowing nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies to engage in 
certain underwriting activities.  The Second Circuit concluded that its 
policy of deference toward the Federal Reserve supported upholding the 
Board’s interpretation of Glass-Steagall as long as that interpretation was 
reasonable.269 
Subsequently, in Securities Industry Ass’n v. Clarke,270 the Second 
Circuit concluded that banks could issue mortgage pass-through 
securities—that is, securities created when a mortgage holder forms a pool 
of mortgages and sells shares in the pool to investors, a process known as 
securitization.  Although mortgage pass-throughs were registered securities 
under securities law, the Second Circuit found that issuing the securities 
was not an impermissible underwriting activity but merely a convenient and 
useful means of carrying out the traditional “business of banking”271— 
raising capital through the securitization process, instead of through 
traditional deposit taking.  Writing for the circuit, Judge Thomas Meskill 
reiterated the great deference that the Second Circuit gave to banking 
regulators on issues of this nature.272  The deregulation that the Second 
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Circuit had allowed federal banking regulators to undertake ultimately 
culminated in the repeal of Glass-Steagall with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act in 1999.273 
Although the Second Circuit has principally focused on questions of 
domestic banking law, given New York’s status as the world’s preeminent 
financial center, the circuit has occasionally weighed in on global banking 
affairs.  The sovereign debt default involving Argentina is a recent example 
of a particularly important international banking case.274  Argentina 
restructured its sovereign debt in 2005, persuading most bondholders to 
accept major write-downs to the principal value of the debt.  A small 
minority of bondholders held out for full repayment, and, when Argentina 
refused to make further payments on their debt, the holdouts sued Argentina 
in New York for violating the pari passu clause of their debt contracts, 
which required Argentina to afford equal treatment to bondholders.  The 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the pari passu clause 
precluded Argentina from paying only bondholders who had accepted 
write-downs, while refusing to pay the holdouts. 
This case is a noteworthy testament to the importance of the Second 
Circuit not just in New York but globally.  Although the case involved a 
matter of Argentina’s national debt, the Second Circuit had jurisdiction over 
the dispute because Argentina waived its sovereign immunity and 
consented to the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit and trial courts in New 
York City.  Such waivers are common in sovereign debt issues in emerging 
markets—reflecting the high esteem in which the Second Circuit and other 
New York courts are held all over the world.275  Moreover, in the Argentina 
case, the Second Circuit explicitly acknowledged the sometimes symbiotic 
relationship between New York’s judicial system and the city’s success as a 
world financial center:  rejecting policy arguments from Argentina that 
strictly enforcing the debt contract would “steer bond issuers from the New 
York marketplace,” Judge Parker noted that, “On the contrary, our decision 
affirms a proposition [of freedom of contract] essential to the integrity of 
the capital markets.”276 
Whether because it has helped ensure the integrity of the securities 
market by helping to develop antifraud and insider trading law, or because 
of its flexible oversight of banking regulation, there can be little doubt that 
New York owes no small measure of its success to its robust judicial system 
and strong commitment to the rule of the law.277  Just as Delaware’s strong 
legal system has helped that state to maintain a preeminent position in the 
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field of corporations and trusts,278 so too has the Second Circuit’s 
jurisprudence helped to maintain investor confidence in New York as a 
leading world financial center. 
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